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Capitalism, primitive accumulation and the 1960s massacres: revisiting the New 
Order and its violent genesis 
Vedi R. HADIZ 
 
ABSTRACT This article offers a critique of Hilmar Farid’s (and to a lesser extent, 
Colm McNaughton’s) contribution in this journal about the 1960s anti-communist 
massacres, primitive accumulation and capitalist development in Indonesia. While 
agreeing that the massacres can be usefully tied to primitive accumulation it argues 
that Farid’s work displays some serious conceptual misunderstandings about the 
workings of capitalist development in Indonesia under the New Order as well as the 
social, political and economic underpinnings of that regime.  As such, it finds that 
there are some major faults as well in his presentation of the logic of capitalist 
accumulation, the way it has been manifest historically in the Indonesian case and its 
role in the emergence of the New Order. Furthermore, the article suggests that a 
fundamental misreading may have been committed by Farid due to a fetish for New 
Order violence that hinders understanding of its political economy. 
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There are a few basic points I would like to make in this relatively brief contribution 
to the debate on “primitive accumulation” in Indonesia as instigated by Hilmar 
Farid’s nearly decade-old article on the subject and Colm McNaughton’s response to 
it. First, Farid’s essay—while exemplary in its intention to reinterpret the Indonesian 
massacres of half a century ago within a framework based on the concept of primitive 
accumulation—leads to some crucial misinterpretations of the nature of the New 
Order regime that emerged in its wake and of Indonesia’s ensuing rapid capitalist 
development.  
Second, while McNaughton usefully widens the scope of analysis to incorporate 
recognition of what he calls the global/local dialectic—thereby placing the Indonesian 
events of 1965–66 more firmly in the Cold War context—it may be fairer to engage 
Farid’s article on its own level of analysis, that is, the development of Indonesian 
capitalism in relation to a particularly distinctive historical conjuncture. In any case, I 
think we can be assured of Farid’s awareness—even if not overtly displayed in the 
article under discussion—of the basic contours of the global capitalism with which 
Indonesia’s economy became more closely integrated after these crucial years, and 
more precisely, the Cold War imperatives that permeated through Indonesian social 
and political struggles throughout the period in question.  
Third, as McNaughton implies but does not elaborate further due to his 
overriding concern to place Indonesian developments within a broader “totality” that 
notionally points to the possibility of emancipatory politics, it is necessary to be 
aware of the complex relationship between the economic and political requisites of 
the New Order’s authoritarianism. In many ways, the relationship does not exactly fit 
caricatures of how national authoritarianisms relate to global imperialist interests. 
Inadequate attention to the nature of the relationship results in Farid’s evidently 
flawed understanding of the sorts of interests that underpinned the New Order at its 
inception and as it evolved, even while they competed for power and wealth through 
regime institutions and sought the continued marginalisation and exclusion of vast 
numbers of the Indonesian people.  
Finally, due to his overly reductionist understanding of the social underpinnings 
of New Order rule, and therefore the kind of capitalist development that it cultivated 
and promoted, Farid’s interpretation of the anti-communist massacres and their 
resultant widespread social dislocations are faulty too in some major respects, 
especially from the point of view of political economy analysis. This is the case even 
if his essay remains laudable and significant as a quite novel attempt to conceive a 
key moment in the history of Indonesian capitalism in a way that inextricably links it 
to an outbreak of systematic violence and coercion. 
 
Primitive Accumulation and Global Capitalism 
 
For—as well summarised by McNaughton—Farid’s main aim is indeed to redirect 
discussion of the 1960s massacres away from “mere” considerations of the human 
rights abuses they involved to analysis of the origins of rapid capitalist development 
in Indonesia after the advent of the New Order (Farid 2005, 9). In Farid’s argument, 
the destruction of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), the accompanying forced 
separation of masses of the Indonesian peasantry from the land—and the 
domestication of organised labour—were all part and parcel of a deliberate economic 
strategy (see below) pursued by those who had directed the expunging of communism 
from Indonesia’s body-politic.  
In constructing his narrative about a process of “primitive accumulation” that 
made possible a qualitatively new phase of Indonesian capitalism, he further suggests 
that such an observation has been essentially missing in the heretofore best-known 
accounts of the development of capitalism and the state in Indonesia, including 
Robison’s (1986) seminal work. He states, for example, that “One should understand 
primitive accumulation as something which, besides forming the starting point of 
capitalism, returns again and again, as the basis or basic precondition which is 
necessary for further phases of capital accumulation” (Farid 2005, 10). This is a 
useful premise, but it should be noted that, for Farid, what is important is not the 
emergence (however to be discerned) of social classes associated with capitalism but 
the resultant compulsion, exercised across the populace, to engage in capitalist social 
relationships (Farid 2005, 5). 
While agreeing with the broad thrust of Farid’s interpretation, McNaughton 
offers a more global and long duree-inspired analysis of primitive accumulation in 
Indonesia, based on a well informed re-reading of Marx and Luxembourg but also the 
much more recent luminaries of world-systems theory. It appears that, for 
McNaughton, the logical imperatives for the violence in Indonesia are not just to be 
found in the need to unleash (what he conceives to be a more prolonged and on-going 
process of) violence as part of primitive accumulation domestically but also in the 
requirements of global capitalist accumulation.  
I will not repeat the details of McNaughton’s alternative interpretation, except 
to note, once again, that it relies on linking the global and local contexts for the 
unfolding of events in Indonesia in the 1960s. In doing so, he attempts to weave 
together a narrative of violence that, at its base, reflected a convergence of particular 
domestic forces and that of international capital and the states representing its 
interests. In constructing this alternative narrative (or—in his words—in sublating 
Farid’s), it is quite plain (at least to this author) that McNaughton underestimates the 
degree to which some of its elements already serve as the background to Farid’s own 
account, although he would be correct in suggesting that the latter did not make more 
than rudimentary attempts to relate Indonesia’s 1960s to that of the broader region 
and the world. I think this background is strongly enough implied in Farid’s 
references, though scattered, to the New Order’s reversal of Soekarno’s anti-
imperialist policies and to concerted Western assistance for this undertaking (which 
McNaughton notes). Such an unintended slight notwithstanding, McNaughton’s 
endeavour to make clearer the application of the concept of primitive accumulation 
deployed by Farid—as the main “weapon” in disarming narrowly conceived human 
rights-based narratives of the Indonesian massacres—is no doubt useful for any future 
research that may be pursued along these lines.  
At the same time, I would like to point to the possibility of incorporating the 
sort of endeavour undertaken by McNaughton within similarly broad historical 
analyses of the ruptures and crises of global capitalism—and more specifically of 
American Empire—quite independently of a world-systems theory that has 
traditionally relied on notions of cyclical patterns of hegemony and disruptions to 
global structural equilibria.1 Such a position is likely to be more straightforwardly 
useful in addressing Farid’s article at his own level of analysis, and therefore more or 
less on his own terms, for it pre-supposes the analytical primacy of domestic 
determinants—such as that of state and class—of capitalist development and modes 
of integration with the global capitalist economy. 
 
The New Order and Indonesian Capitalism 
 
Rather than proceeding at this stage to direct engagement with Farid’s treatment of 
primitive accumulation in Indonesia, it may be more useful to momentarily skip this 
task in order to provide a brief analysis of the development of the Indonesian state and 
capitalism under the aegis of the New Order (for a fuller treatment see Robison and 
Hadiz [2004] and Hadiz and Robison [2013]). For it is following such a discussion 
that a critique of Farid’s characterisation of primitive accumulation in Indonesia in the 
1960s can be developed with a specific understanding of the Indonesian state and 
capitalism and of the bases of economic and political power that were ultimately 
fused in the long Soeharto era in the form of oligarchic rule. From here, the 
significant drawbacks of his analysis of primitive accumulation should become more 
apparent. 
A major flaw of Farid’s article, to my mind, can be found in its portrayal of the 
New Order that emerged after the orgy of violence as basically a military or 
militarised regime. Actually, Farid goes further than such a characterisation, for he 
calls it no less than Soeharto’s “military state”—and one, moreover, “that was entirely 
dependent upon foreign aid and loans (until it finally overdosed in the late 1990s)” 
(Farid 2005, 4, 5). In this, he not only misrepresents the Asian Economic Crisis and 
the (shifting) economic bases of the New Order, but also repeats a mistake that has 
been committed, albeit in different forms, by other analysts of its political character. 
These have either overly simplified the New Order by reducing it to a case of 
militarism,2 and/or treated the Indonesian military as being subservient to, or in some 
sort of comprador relationship with the imagined-to-be monolithic forces of capital, 
especially international. This in spite of Farid’s apt reminder that “the army certainly 
did not simply serve as a kind of loyal attack dog for foreign and domestic capital” 
(Farid 2005, 5) and that it had its own institutional interests. Moreover, Farid makes 
the peculiarly sweeping claim that the New Order project, and its associated economic 
policies, had effectively nullified the “democratic ideals of an entire generation of 
nationalists” (Farid 2005, 10), thus ignoring the very strong and longstanding strands 
of highly conservative and integralistic politics within Indonesian nationalism, whose 
intellectual cousins helped give rise to fascism in other historical contexts (Bourchier 
2015). In many ways, the New Order in fact represented the victory of those 
representing such strands and therefore, to state the obvious, these did not just come 
out of the blue in the mid-1960s. 
In the works cited by McNaughton, Robison and I have offered analyses of the 
New Order that show how these sorts of characterisations are politically and 
analytically misleading. The New Order was in fact far more complex than many of 
its critics and analysts suggested in its internal composition and logic, certainly more 
so than they were sometimes willing to concede or “appreciate.”3  
More than just a military or military-dominated regime (Crouch 1988), it 
gradually fused a range of politico-bureaucratic and capitalist interests within an 
oligarchy that had effectively seized power over the state and its myriad institutions 
for itself, and was involved in a relationship with sections of international capital that 
was sometimes perceptibly conflicting. Such conflicts, while already seen during the 
oil boom period, were ultimately most apparent at the height of the Asian Economic 
Crisis. In the process, the military—while always feared by the people—had become 
increasingly and decisively side-lined during the last decade of Soeharto’s rule by the 
ever more sophisticated social alliances that came to be incubated and nurtured within 
the New Order as Indonesian capitalism evolved.  
Reading Farid’s account, however, one would be forgiven for thinking that the 
military had maintained its dominant position within the New Order (Farid 2005, 5) 
till its end and that the relationship between the oligarchy and the military, as an 
institution that was nonetheless closely intertwined with it, was consistently 
harmonious. This is in spite of the details of such conflicts that have been provided by 
authors like Mietzner (2009) and Aspinall (2005). It should be pointed out as well that 
the source of the schism was nothing less fundamental than the subordination of the 
military to oligarchy, as seen in the ascendancy of the Soeharto family and those of 
select cronies within Indonesian capitalism. Such subordination involved the relative 
marginalisation of the military-as-capitalist institution—after the military-as-
apparatus-of-violence had contributed so much to the very establishment of the New 
Order—including by the prior instigation and direction of large-scale massacres and 
dislocations in untold numbers of communities as described in vivid terms by Farid. 
In fact, Farid’s references to the New Order that emerged in the wake of the 
massacres of the 1960s are strangely notable for the absence of competing interests—
as if the regime (or “state” as Farid mistakenly refers to it) were merely a vessel for 
military power. Of course, this tendency may be a by-product of Farid’s accounting 
for the systematic and terrifying violence unleashed on Indonesian society that 
continues to traumatise it (Farid 2005, 14) However, this is ultimately no substitute 
for an understanding of the sorts of social interests that were to drive the development 
of Indonesian capitalism, especially if there was supposed to have been a primitive 
accumulation process that was unleashed specifically to make that development 
possible. Startlingly, the military is more or less depicted by Farid only as an 
apparatus of violence, while even as early as Robison’s earliest works we have known 
it to represent a major, and at one time, far more powerful faction of state capital than 
it is today. Hadiz (1997), among others, has pointed out that the military’s impulse to 
destroy the PKI—an organisation ideologically inclined towards workers’ control 
over the means of production—partially emanated from its own role as manager-
capitalist within the early post-colonial Indonesian economy. This role could be 
traced back at least to the nationalisation of foreign companies that was carried out in 
the 1950s, the authority over which was placed in the hands of the military in spite of 
the protestations of radical unions. 
What has been the purpose of this roundabout way of contributing to the debate 
on primitive accumulation in Indonesia as undertaken by Farid and McNaughton? 
First, it points to the implausibility that the massacres were part of a consciously 
deployed economic strategy. While not the occurrence of spontaneous violence 
inferred by other analysts, or a mere “logical” outcome of long lingering social 
animosities—interpretations that Farid rightly eschews—it had very real sources in 
the contradictions of development of the early Indonesian post-colonial political 
economy. This aspect of the problem is virtually ignored by Farid in his zeal to 
underline the profound effect of the violence of the 1960s to the further development 
of Indonesian capitalism, while underscoring its organised and systematic nature. 
As a result, Farid tends to ignore the structural context within which the 
massacres occurred. It must be remembered that in the absence of petty bourgeois 
elements capable of taking a vanguard role in capitalist accumulation—as witnessed 
consistently throughout the 1950s—it was the state itself and its corps of officials that 
eventually took up the task. The most developed part of the state was the military, 
which in the 1950s was already deeply embedded in the economy—and in politics 
and state administration—due to the “emergency” that was in response to a range of 
separatist movements. In these roles, the military had become increasingly embroiled 
in conflict with the PKI, which continued to preach revolutionary transformation all 
the way to its demise even if it was not immune to making strategic changes born of 
pragmatism.4 It was only in such a context that the military, as part of the state, was 
especially well suited to carry out the violence and displacement associated with 
primitive accumulation. This is the case even if the military’s position was to be 
eventually downgraded in the further development of Indonesian capitalism. Given 
such a role of the state, it is not difficult to see why Indonesia’s highly rapacious big 
bourgeoisie eventually crystallised out of state power itself once a regime was forged 
that made this possible through closer integration with the international economy—
though one that was not free of important contradictions—as a close reading of New 
Order political economy would clearly show. 
It should be apparent that the point of view offered here is quite different from 
Farid’s, who argues that “…Suharto and his allied army officers orchestrated the 
repression and pushed aside President Sukarno with an economic strategy already in 
mind” (Farid 2005, 4). Notwithstanding many years of American courting of key 
sections of the Indonesian military leadership in the 1950s and 1960s and of its small 
intelligentsia (Simpson 2010), such a level of conscious individual motivation is not 
necessary to recognise the fact that Soekarno’s “anti-imperialist” policies came to be 
increasingly contrary to the interests of some powerful domestic social forces, 
including the military. Positing the existence of such conscious motivation, however, 
leads Farid to overlook the complexity of the relationship between the economic and 
political requisites of New Order rule, while simultaneously conferring a degree of 
prescience that the “clique” around Soeharto simply could not have had in any 
reasonable sense. It must be recalled, for example, that it wasn’t until the early 1970s 
that the New Order’s model of authoritarian state corporatism was well established 
and that beyond a general disposition toward capitalism and connecting with the 
world economy, development strategy underwent several important shifts in the three 
decades of New Order rule (Robison and Hadiz 2004). These shifts were the product 
of significant contests between sections of domestic and international capital as well 
as a powerful corps of state officials, including an economic technocracy whose 
influence constantly waxed and waned over the years (while being transformed from 
acolytes of Keynesian economics to a more distinctly neo-liberal economic theory). 
Second, it is somewhat negligent to imply that the military did not have support 
from important societal elements in its destruction of Indonesian communism, as 
Farid does by glossing over the existence of such support. The Indonesian military, 
which itself was riven by important internal conflicts (exploited by Soeharto for his 
own political ascendancy), was obviously aided by others who were threatened by the 
PKI’s revolutionary agenda. Among these were the small urban, and of course, rural 
propertied (Tornquist 1984)—and even sections of the precariously salaried middle 
class whose material conditions of life were deteriorating in the midst of Soekarno’s 
hyper-inflationary economic policies. One needn’t dismiss such social conflicts 
(emerging from the contradictions of the post colonial economy) out of hand for the 
sake of preserving the view—no matter how correct—that the violence in Indonesia 
was largely directed against a confused and rudderless PKI and its purported 
supporters who were unable to significantly fight back (Farid 2005, 7). After all, from 
where did the paramilitary and youth organisations mobilised by the military, 
mentioned in the article, spring from?  
Third—and this is a point that merges with one raised by McNaughton but is to 
be developed in the section to follow—primitive accumulation continued in Indonesia 
after the massacres and social dislocations of the period scrutinised by Farid. It has a 
major part in the evolution of the exceptionally predatory form of capitalism that has 
come to be identified with the practices of a state-enforced and pervasive politics of 
plunder. From this point of view, primitive accumulation in Indonesia, under the aegis 
of the state, could be usefully compared to and contrasted with subsequent phases of 
primitive accumulation in post-Soviet Russia and in contemporary China (Holstrom 
and Smith 2000). In fact, these may serve as the more appropriate comparisons (on 
the matter of primitive accumulation) than the case of Chile that both Farid and 
McNaughton refer to, notwithstanding the fact that the military coup plotters against 
Allende are well known to have been inspired by events in Jakarta in the preceding 
decade. 
 
Primitive Accumulation in Indonesia 
 
One of the major shortcomings in the literature on Indonesian capitalism that Farid 
seeks to address in his essay is inadequate analysis of the pre-conditions of capitalist 
development. He states (Farid 2005, 5) that: 
 
It is widely understood in the literature on the political economy of Indonesia 
that the mid-1960s represents a dramatic historical break, that the economy 
under the New Order was radically different from the pre-1965 economy. A 
noted scholar on Indonesian contemporary politics, Richard Robison, for 
instance, noted that the expansion of capitalism after the mid-1960s was 
possible “only after the political victory of the military over the PKI and the 
Sukarno regime, which in turn secured a victory at the social level for the 
propertied classes over the threat posed by the landless and the urban workers” 
(Robison 1986, 109). Yet the focus in Robison’s studies, as in so many others, 
is on the capitalist development itself, not on those pre-conditions for the 
development, and pays little attention to how the army’s continuing use of 
violence helped to create those landless workers. I do not view capitalism as 
solely a matter of the bourgeoisie, as Robison’s studies of Indonesia’s 
“business class” imply. Nor do I view the working class as only those people 
who are today working in a factory for a wage. Rather, following Marx 
himself, I see capital as a social relation which involves the formation of a 
working class and its reproduction year-in year-out as a populace willing to 
work under the command of those who control the capital. 
 
As mentioned earlier, this is a laudable endeavour, and Farid has carried out 
much of it with considerable aplomb. The observations he makes about coerced 
involvement into wage labour relations after 1965—at least on one occasion at 
gunpoint—are powerful and contribute to a fuller account of Indonesian capitalist 
development. No doubt 1965 was a turning point in the history of Indonesian 
capitalism in many respects, even if Farid rightly does not suggest that it marked its 
beginnings. However, what came afterwards was no less important in terms of 
primitive accumulation and Indonesian capitalism, even if it had less overtly bloody 
manifestations. But Farid makes statements that serve to obscure his awareness of this 
fact, which I do not doubt, such as in the following (Farid 2005, 2): 
 
The military state that resulted from this generalized terror campaign devoted 
itself over the following years to promoting the interests of domestic and 
foreign capital. It expropriated people for development projects and 
maintained a docile populace, thus repeating the same sort of violence that it 
committed in its early years. 
 
In the process, Farid’s clearly expressed emphasis on the social relational 
aspects of capitalism is oddly left unexplored in the rest of the article except in the 
aforementioned anecdotes about the coerced incorporation of sections of the 
Indonesian population into capitalist social relations in the form of wage labour 
compelled to work for the owners of capital. As a consequence, it remains unclear to 
me why the specific events described—as much as they might have represented more 
widespread practices—were pivotal in the spread of capitalist social relationships in 
Indonesia in any theoretically rigorous explanation. As Farid acknowledges, these 
social relationships had already existed due to their introduction during colonial 
times. Did the violence then produce a rupture whereby a previously slower process 
of proliferation was somehow accelerated? Even if this were the case, trauma and fear 
only go so far in explaining this because the compulsion to work for capital, as Farid 
no doubt understands, is rooted in the basic necessity to materially survive within the 
prevailing capitalist system. Hence the internalisation of terror is only of limited value 
as explication for the virtually continual growth of capitalist social relationships in 
Indonesia since the New Order was in fuller swing. 
This can be appreciated more fully in political economy analysis that would 
actually scrutinise the lag between the destruction of the PKI and rapid 
industrialisation in Indonesia, which only took place when the New Order “model” of 
organising political and economic power came to be securely established. The latter 
actually took some time to achieve, perhaps up to around 1973, when a state 
corporatist system was finally entrenched and when windfall oil revenues were about 
to allow the state to act as engine of development in lieu of a domestic big 
bourgeoisie. But Farid, rather resentfully dismisses various possible indicators of 
industrialisation, social change and class formation as unimportant (Farid 2005, 5, 9), 
especially those of a quantitative nature. I am not sure why, for it seems to me that 
this is akin to throwing out the baby with the bathwater (especially if one were 
interested in a dynamic analysis, rather than snapshot accounts, of social 
transformations). But it should be possible, surely, to utilise these indicative data 
without falling into hyper-empiricism. 
In any case, it was from then to the 1990s that various state policies compelled 
ever-larger numbers of the peasantry to leave the land as well as produced fuller-scale 
modern capitalist enterprises, all the way to giant conglomerates. After a relatively 
short period in which foreign aid was especially crucial in the reorganisation of the 
Indonesian economy and its institutions, such policies were robustly executed first 
under import substitution industrialisation propelled by the state largely through 
bountiful oil revenues and then for a time, when these had dissipated, under export-
led industrialisation based on low-wage manufactured exports. It was at this latter 
stage that economic sectors were opened up to foreign capital in many areas 
previously closed to it, through a raft of policy changes that also allowed by now big 
domestic businesses (and the banks they had established as cash cows) to access new 
sources of finance and spread their tentacles throughout the economy. Of course, 
these strategies were accompanied variously by the plundering of Indonesia’s natural 
resources, transformations in land use, the extra-economically achieved mass 
expulsions of local communities to make way for factories, middle class housing 
projects and tourist resorts, not to mention plantations and mining operations, as well 
as generally ever-greater pressures for engagement in the capitalist economy at all 
levels of society. 
Surely, this aspect of the history capitalism in Indonesia cannot be ignored if 
Farid is truly interested, as he claims to be, in the matter of the reproduction of the 
capitalist system (Farid 2005, 3, 8)—for it is in such developments that we really see 
how it became socially more and more difficult for people to live and work in ways 
disengaged from the capitalist economy. Ironically, for all of Farid’s disdain for 
formal measures of capitalist development, he backs up his argument about the 
importance of coercion into wage labour in the aftermath of 1965 by suggesting that 
at least three million people would have been affected by the New Order’s “clean 
environment” policy—whereby anyone associated or related to known communists 
were continually harassed if not suppressed. This is what Farid proposes made the 
“reproduction of the capital relation much easier” (Farid 2005, 13)—because such 
affected individuals would have compliantly settled for any form of low wage 
employment. The sum total of this explanation for capitalist reproduction, to my 
mind, amounts to a rather bizarre form of Marxist analysis. 
Perhaps McNaughton makes an astute observation, therefore, when he suggests 
that Farid effectively conflates different understandings of primitive accumulation.5 
He is also certainly correct that Farid neglects to theoretically explain the foreign 
investment and aid that poured into Indonesia from the point of view of the requisites 
of capitalist accumulation—whether at a national or global scale. But more 
significantly, how is the continual and systematic plunder of Indonesian natural 
resources over several decades—which has contributed directly or indirectly to the 
concentration of wealth and social inequalities that we now associate so strongly with 
the Indonesian political economy—to be conceptualised in relation to the primitive 
accumulation of the particularly violent period that Farid describes? Incidentally, such 
plunder has not been linked only to capital accumulation by politically well-connected 
domestic capitalists but also foreign multinationals—and this shows that international 
capital has no intrinsic need for regularised and transparent markets as World Bank 
economists might opine. One might ask, more specifically, how Farid might relate the 
on-going plunder of Papuan resources—especially as executed by entities like 
Freeport-McMoran (Tebay 2005, 11–13)—in collaboration with Indonesian security 
forces, state officials and capitalists—to his conceptualisation of primitive 
accumulation that seems to be quite excessively narrow for broader application. Are 
such practices simply a repetition of a well-tried strategy on Java in the 1960s or do 
they implicate mechanics of primitive accumulation arising from far more developed 
social alliances involving the state, including its coercive apparatus and different 
factions of capital? 
A key contribution that McNaughton makes to the discussion is to skilfully 
elaborate on the many facets of primitive accumulation and how these might 
contribute to dissimilar though related conceptualisations of primitive accumulation. 
Such is the case in spite of some niggling reservations I might have about what seems 
like a somewhat un-nuanced understanding of the ways in which “colonial, neo-
colonial and imperialist relations feed into a world system of capitalist 
accumulation.”6  
Ultimately, I would be inclined toward a conceptualisation of primitive 
accumulation in Indonesia that minimally proceeds from the more explicit position 
that it has been a continual process manifested in a diversity of ways. That while often 
less “dramatic,” it has included the politics of plunder of a range of terrestrial and 
maritime socially-owned resources (oil, minerals, arable land, forests and many 
others) for the purposes of private accumulation, alongside the continual systemic 
exclusion of large sections of the Indonesian population from the riches they yield. 
Power relations facilitating massive levels of corruption and abuse continuing in the 
present democratic period clearly have much to do with this. Furthermore, such a 
conceptualisation should more overtly recognise that such processes have taken place 
alongside the highly exacerbated separation of direct producers from control over the 
means of production to the point that material survival is implausible without direct or 
indirect engagement in the capitalist economy and its associated social relationships. 
This is so even if it is achieved without necessarily the sort of generalised physical 
violence to which Farid gives primacy in his explanation of the mechanics of 
primitive accumulation in Indonesia in 1965–66. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This has been a relatively brief and perhaps all too cursory intervention into the 
thought-provoking debate on primitive accumulation between Farid and 
McNaughton—in spite of the decade-long lag between their essays. I should perhaps 
make it clearer, at this point, that I found many more things to applaud in both than to 
criticise, although for the purposes of hopefully advancing debate I have necessarily 
focussed on what I perceive to be their shortcomings. I have done so especially with 
regard to Farid’s article.  
To summarise, his is an important and novel interpretation of the 1960s 
massacres in Indonesia but one that is riddled by ambiguities in conceptualisation and 
a misreading of certain aspects of the development of the Indonesian political 
economy over the last half a century. In this article, I have highlighted the most 
important of such flaws, and perhaps in a rather roundabout way, attempted to 
pinpoint some observations that may contribute toward rectifying them. In doing so, I 
have elected to engage with Farid’s ideas on their own terms—at their own level of 
analysis—by providing primacy to the domestic determinants of capitalist 
development and global economic integration, paying attention to their associated 
social struggles (some of which I found to have been either too simplified or ignored 
by Farid in his essay). This is a strategy that is different from that chosen by 
McNaughton in his own stimulating essay but one which I hope would no less 
encourage further discussion. I have suggested that it is too simplistic to conceive of a 
one to one correspondence between the economic and political requisites of the New 
Order, though the destruction of the PKI clearly paved the way for the trajectory that 
the regime would go on. Such an observation would need to be accommodated in 
explanations of the violence of 1965–66 that link it to primitive accumulation but is 
largely absent in Farid’s article. In the process, I am also suggesting that we do not 
replace capitalism’s commodity fetishism with a fetish for its violence—something I 
fear may have been inadvertently “accomplished” by Farid. 
 
Notes                                                         
1 See Wallerstein’s (2008) comments on the global financial crisis; and compare to 
those by Resnick and Wolff (2010); also see Panitch and Gindin (2012) on the 
political economy of Empire.   
2 A recent example can be found in an otherwise theoretically sophisticated and 
historically rich work by Slater (2010), whereby the Indonesian authoritarian 
trajectory is placed in the same category with Burma—that of “militarism.” 
3 Perhaps it is worth repeating here that Robison and Hadiz (2004, 43) had understood 
the New Order as embodying a metamorphosis of state and class power, which 
resulted in evolution toward the following: (1) A regulatory apparatus imposing a 
framework of fiscal and monetary discipline and highly organised political 
repression aimed at preventing the economic and social disorder that had corroded 
                                                                                                                                                              
the previous regime. Within this was established: (2) A system of organising state 
and society relations characterised primarily by the disorganisation of civil society 
and the dominance of state-created corporatist institutions; and (3) An extensive and 
complex system of patronage, personified by Soeharto himself, and the apex of 
which lay at Cendana Palace. This system of patronage penetrated all layers of 
society from Jakarta down to the provinces, kabupaten, towns and villages. (4) 
During its heyday it became a capitalist oligarchy that fused public authority and 
private interest, epitomised in the rise of such families as the Soehartos. 
4 As seen from its enthusiastic and successful participation in parliamentary 
democracy in the 1950s and then the alliance it struck with Soekarno in the 
subsequent illiberal period known as Guided Democracy. 
5 See McNaughton’s essay in this volume. 
6 See McNaughton’s essay in this volume. 
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